

Introduction

Post-Quantum Standardization process

- ▶ Started by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2016
- ▶ Protect from *harvest now, decrypt later* by attackers with quantum computers
 - ▷ All currently deployed asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable

Motivations

- ▶ HQC [1] is a code-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism with promising performance
- ▶ Reference hardware design [2] gave a prompt assessment, although it is un-optimized

We provide an efficient HQC HW design supporting all security levels




Figure: Key Encapsulation Mechanism exchanging a shared secret




Figure: binary polynomial multiplication

1. Multiplication of binary polynomials

- ▶ operand1 has few non-zero coefficients; operand2 coefficients are accessed in blocks
- ▶ For each operand2 block: shift the bits and accumulate the result
- ▶ operand2 starting block and shift size are determined by the non-zero operand1 bits
- ▶ Perform parallel rotations, scaling indefinitely with the number of memory read ports

Using two dual-port memories, the operation latency decreased by 4×

2. Concatenated Reed-Muller/Reed-Solomon decoder

- ▶ Reed-Muller code is decoded with a Maximum Likelihood approach using the fast Hadamard transform
 - ▷ Rapidly compare the 128 values with a tree of comparators to find the peak value
- ▶ Adapted a low-latency, highly optimized Reed-Solomon decoder designed for network communication [4]
 - ▷ Supporting in a single design all the three shortened RS codes defined by the HQC security levels

53× faster than the HLS-based reference code, and taking only 1/2 LUTs and 1/10 FFs




Figure: use of the public Error Correction Code in HQC





Figure: order of sampled polynomials

3. Sampling of binary polynomials

- ▶ Sample the polynomials following the data dependency given by the algorithms of primitives
- ▶ Improvement to the HQC specification, benefited by both HW and SW implementations

Performance gains from 13% to 32% on the entire cryptographic primitive at no cost

4. Comparison of the Key Generation, Encapsulation, and Decapsulation primitives (sec. margin of AES-128)



Conclusions

A **single unified HQC HW** design compatible with:

- ▶ all the security levels (equiv. to the ones of AES-128, AES-192, AES-256)
- ▶ all the KEM primitives (key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation)

Compared to designs **compatible only with the lowest security level**:

- ▶ latency reduced from 1.56× to 2.38×
- ▶ efficiency improved from 1.24× to 1.88×

Acknowledgements

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References

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